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Abstract
This is the rst paper to investigate the timing of the R&D decisions in a mixed
market. Considering a model in which a public rm competes against a private
one, we examine the desirable (welfare-maximizing) and the equilibrium R&D role
of the public rm. Our results suggest that from a social point of view, the public
rm should carry out its investment as a Stackelberg follower. Using the observable
delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990) 29],
we show that the public rm may play this desirable role.
Keywords: Endogenous timing, R&D, Stackelberg, mixed market.
JEL Classication: L13, L31, L32.
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1 Introduction
Strategic R&D competition between public and private rms has become an increasingly
active eld of interest. For instance, in the Norwegian oil industry the state-owned
company Statoil competes against the private rms Norske Shell (or Shell Technology)
and Exxon (see e.g. Pal, 1998). These companies with Exxon to a lesser extent initiate
large technological programmes.1 In that and related contexts, an alternative sequence in
the rmsR&D decisions may a¤ect the market outcome in important ways. Surprisingly
though, issues of timing in the R&D moves of rms operating in mixed markets have not
been considered so far by the literature.
Previous studies have investigated sequential-move models with an output market
focus and showed that when the rmsdecision is endogenised the outcome is in general
ambiguous. Pal (1998) showed that depending on the number of private rms (and the
time periods the game lasts), the public rm can either be the leader or the follower in
equilibrium.2 More recently, Matsumura (2003) extended Pals analysis by allowing for
foreign rms. In the context of a duopoly market, where the output decision process
can last up to two time periods, he showed that the equilibrium role of the public rm
(which coincides with its desirable role) is that of an output-setting leader. However,
Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003) did not allow for R&D investments. Nishimori and
Ogawa (2002) focused on this issue, though under a di¤erent research direction, and
found that deregulation of a former public monopoly induces a reduction in the public
rms investments.3 Finally, Gil Moltó, PoyagoTheotoky and Zikos (2006) investigated
1Statoil was very active in R&D aimed at the development of fuel cells and related hydrogen tech-
nologies. Now, it is mainly investing on the development of a dual cycle energy production system based
on fuel cells. Similarly, Norske Shell is a major investor in energy systems based on SOFC (Solid Oxyde
Fuel Cells); see Godø et al. (2003) for a more detailed discussion.
2Jacques (2004) and Lu (2007) qualied Proposition 4:1 in Pal (1998) by identifying under which
circumstances it remains valid and by showing the existence of two additional equilibria.
3For earlier contributions see Delbono and Denicoló (1993), Nett (1994) and PoyagoTheotoky (1998).
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the role of technology policy towards R&D both before and after privatization. They
showed that privatization leads to a lower R&D subsidy and reductions in the level of
social welfare.
These papers have shed considerable light on aspects of strategic interaction in mixed
markets. However, a number of issues still await investigation and these indeed form
the subject of the present paper. In the context of a mixed duopoly (where a public
rm competes against a private one), the rst objective of this paper is to examine the
desirable R&D role of the public rm. By considering a two-stage Cournot model 
building upon dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) as a benchmark case, we are in
position to disentangle the e¤ect on consumer surplus and the rmsprots implied by
a change in the sequence of R&D moves. This, in turn, will determine the regime, which
is most desirable from a social perspective. The same inuence on social welfare can be
uncovered by analyzing the market failures in the cases when the public rm retains the
leader or follower position. The key point here is the co-existence of distortions in the
R&D and in the output markets, which are indeed carefully analyzed.
A classication of welfare levels is essential in order to determine the desirable R&D
role of the public rm. As a next step, it would be reasonable to explore which roles will
actually be chosen in equilibrium. For this purpose, we adopt the observable delay game
of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).4 In this game, the rms rst choose when to invest
in R&D (and commit to this decision); rms then make their R&D investments (at the
same stage or at di¤erent stages) and nally, they compete in quantities. The study of
this game will reveal whether the desirable allocation of R&D roles can, in fact, arise in
4In their seminal contribution on endogenous timing, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) also presented
an alternative game; so-called action commitment game. According to this game it is possible that in
a mixed strategy equilibrium rms choose output levels other than those implied by the Cournot or
Stackelberg games. Hence, the observable delay game is more suitable to discuss the endogeneity of the
rmsroles (see also Matsumura, 2003).
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equilibrium. In turn, this will indicate whether coordinationof the R&D activity among
rms can be achieved without any form of intervention.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and o¤ers
an explanation of the observable delay game. Section 3 then derives the Nash equilibrium
for the Cournot and the Stackelberg games of xed timing. The next section turns to a
comparison of the results obtained and presents the desirable R&D role of the public rm.
Section 5 investigates its equilibrium role and nally, section 6, draws the conclusions.
2 The model
Consider an industry in which a state-owned public rm competes with a private rm.
The inverse demand function is assumed linear of the standard form P (Q) = A   Q,
where Q = q0+q1 and A  Q; let P denote the price of the homogeneous product and q0,
q1, the quantities of the public and the private rm, respectively. Suppose further that
all rms engage in cost-reducing (process) R&D under a fully e¢ cient patent system5
(i.e., spillovers are equal to zero). All rms have identical cost functions of the form
Ci(xi; qi) = (c  xi)qi + kq2i , where A > c, k > 0 and xi denotes the R&D investment of
rm i, for 0 < xi  c, i 2 f0; 1g.6 Moreover, the R&D cost borne by rm i is quadratic,
so as to capture diminishing returns in the rate of R&D investment xi,  i(xi) = x2i .
The prot function of rm i is given by:
i = P (Q)qi   Ci(xi; qi)   i(xi), i 2 f0; 1g. (1)
5Admittedly, this assumption is rather special and is made for the purpose of tractability. In future
work, we aim at exploring the implications of relaxing it.
6As in the seminal framework of dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the marginal cost curve shifts
downwards by the amount of R&D output, while its slope is not a¤ected, i.e., mci = (c   xi) + 2kqi.
Moreover, the presence of a quadratic term in the (total) cost function is part of a routinely formulation
in mixed oligopolies that serves the purpose of ruling out the uninteresting case of a public monopoly
(through the introduction of diminishing returns in production).
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Social welfare, dened as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, is given by:
SW =
1
2
Q2 +
1X
i=0
[P (Q)qi   Ci(xi; qi)   i(xi)]: (2)
We now turn to present the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
In the rst stage, rms simultaneously and independently announce at which period they
will choose their R&D levels (and commit to this decision).7 Each rm then chooses its
R&D level and nally, rms compete in quantities.
A more detailed discussion of the game based on an excellent exposition by Mat-
sumura (2003)  is in order. In stage one (t = 1), rms choose simultaneously and
independently ti 2 (2; 3). This means that if ti = 2, rm i will choose its R&D level in
period 2. (Similarly for ti = 3.) Following their decisions rms observe t1 and t2. In
stage two (t = 2), the rm that has chosen ti = 2 makes its R&D investment, while
knowing when the other rm will choose its own R&D level. Hence, if ti = 2 for all i; a
simultaneous-moves (Cournot) game in R&D arises; however, if ti 6= tj, i 6= j, i; j 2 f0; 1g,
then the game is sequential.8 Finally, a Cournot game in output is played. Our objective
is to solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of this extended game by
backward induction.9
7As noted by Pal (1998), the assumption of commitment is not restrictive in the sense that rms
have no incentive to deviate from their decision in a later time period.
8In case that ti = 2 and tj = 3, this means that rm j delays its R&D choice (until period 3), while
rm i chooses its R&D level in the earlier time period 2. The terminology observable delay game is
due to the fact that at the end of the rst stage each rm observes when its rival will move and indeed
whether it will delay investing in R&D.
9To check the robustness of our results one possible extension would be to consider the case when
rms compete in prices (Bertrand competition) rather than in quantities (Cournot competition). We nd
that in this case, a complete characterization of the SPNE outcomes becomes quite complex and several
questions cannot be thoroughly answered. However, it is clear that a comparison between the two models
will depend critically on the di¤erence in the nature of strategic interaction, which will presumably alter
(some of) the conclusions of our analysis.
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3 Games of xed timing
3.1 The Cournot R&D game
According to the timing of this game, in the last stage each rm chooses its quantity qi to
maximize its objective. From the rst order conditions (focs) of this problem, we obtain
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities of the public and the private rm:
qc0(x0; x1) =
(2k + 1)(A  c) + 2(1 + k)x0   x1
1 + 6k + 4k2
; (3)
qc1 (x0; x1) =
2k(A  c) + (2k + 1)x1   x0
1 + 6k + 4k2
; (4)
where the superscript crefers to the case of Cournot R&D competition.
In the rst stage, rms choose their R&D levels xi anticipating how this may a¤ect
competition at the output selection stage. Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) and (2) and
taking the rst order condition (foc) with respect to xi; this gives rise to the following
R&D reaction functions:10
rc0(x1) =
(1 + 6k + 16k2 + 8k3)(A  c)  2(1 + 4k + 2k2)x1
 1 + 10k + 68k2 + 88k3 + 32k4 ; (5)
rc1(x0) =
(1 + 3k + 2k2) [2k(A  c)  x0]
k(7 + 36k + 44k2 + 16k3)
: (6)
Notice that the R&D reaction curves are negatively sloped (i.e., R&D is a strategic
substitute). This amounts to saying that if rm i increases its own R&D level, this will
lead to a reduction in the R&D level of rm j, for i 6= j, i; j 2 f0; 1g. Solving the system
10The second order condition (soc) for the public rm is   1+10k+68k2+88k3+32k4(1+6k+4k2)2 < 0 and for the
private rm   2k(7+36k+44k2+16k3)(1+6k+4k2)2 < 0. Moreover, the stability condition for the public rm reads as 2(1+4k+2k2) 1+10k+68k2+88k3+32k4  < 1 and for the private rm  (1+3k+2k2)k(7+36k+44k2+16k3)  < 1: Indeed, all conditions are
fullled.
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of (5) and (6), we obtain the equilibrium R&D levels:
xc0 =
k(3 + 14k + 8k2)(A  c)
 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4 ; (7)
xc1 =
( 1 + k + 10k2 + 8k3)(A  c)
 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4 : (8)
Then from (3), (4), (7) and (8), the SPNE solutions of the entire game follow (see
Appendix A).
3.2 The Stackelberg R&D game with a public leader
We now assume that the public rm sets its R&D level as a Stackelberg leader. In the
last stage of the game, the expressions for equilibrium output are given by (3) and (4). In
the preceding stage, the private follower maximizes prots with respect to x1. Then the
public leader chooses its own R&D level to maximize welfare, anticipating the reaction
function of the follower as in (6). This yields the following investment:11
xl0 =
k(A  c)


; (9)
where the superscript lstands for the case of the public R&D leader;  = 17 + 194k +
684k2+952k3+576k4+128k5 and 
 =  16  57k+394k2+2604k3+5528k4+5536k5+
2688k6 + 512k7. Substitutions reveal the equilibrium values of the game (see Appendix
B).
11The soc reads as   Hk(7+36k+44k2+16k3)2 < 0, where H =  16   57k + 394k2 + 2604k3 + 5528k4 +
5536k5 + 2688k6 + 512k7.
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3.3 The Stackelberg R&D game with a private leader
We now turn to the case where the private rm retains the R&D leader position. Follow-
ing the same procedure as for the previous games, we obtain the second stage reaction
function for the public follower as in (5). The private rm then maximizes prots taking
into account (5). The solution to this yields:12
xf1 =
(1 + 6k + 4k2)2( 1  k + 16k2 + 16k3)(A  c)
k 
; (10)
where fdenotes the case of the public R&D follower and   =  41   212k + 436k2 +
4624k3+10608k4+10944k5+5376k6+1024k7. Substitutions reveal the equilibrium values
of the game, which are given in the Appendix C.
4 Comparison
In this section, we compare the results of the Stackelberg and Cournot models. The
following Proposition contains an ordering of the R&D and output levels:13
Proposition 1 For all k > 0, the ordering of R&D investment and output for the public
and the private rm under the di¤erent structures  = c, f , l in the timing of R&D
decisions are as follows:
(i) xc0 > x
f
0 > x
l
0, (ii) x
f
1 > x
l
1 > x
c
1,
(iii) qc0 > q
f
0 > q
l
0, (iv) q
f
1 > q
l
1 > q
c
1.
According to part (iii), the public rms presence as a Stackelberg leader is accom-
panied by the lowest output among all cases. This result, not new to the literature, is
12The soc is   2k( 1+10k+68k2+88k3+32k4)2 < 0, where  =  41   212k + 436k2 + 4624k3 + 10608k4 +
10944k5 + 5376k6 + 1024k7.
13All proofs are relegated to the Appendix D.
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in line with the predictions of the seminal paper by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and
may provide us with an understanding of the ranking applying to R&D. That is, when
the public rm is the leader, it recognizes that the R&D reaction function of the private
follower is downward sloping. On the grounds of this observation and taking into account
that the private rm is more e¢ cient (i.e., it has a lower marginal and total cost), it
is optimal for the public rm to reduce its investment relative to the case of Cournot
competition. (By doing so, the public rm may partially correct an important failure
of a Cournot mixed market  the ine¢ ciency in the distribution of equilibrium cost 
arising from the di¤erence in the rmsobjectives.) Moreover, we obtain the intuitive
outcome that the public rm invests more in R&D as a Cournot player rather than when
it engages in a Stackelberg game at the follower position. The reverse ranking applies
to the private competitor for the case of Cournot competition, i.e., private R&D is the
lowest. As might also be expected, the largest investment is attained when the private
rm is a Stackelberg leader.
As for total R&D and output, the following result is largely a consequence of Propo-
sition 1.
Corollary 1 Stackelberg leadership in R&D by the public rm generates the smallest
total investment, whereas the largest investment is associated with the public rm being
a Stackelberg R&D follower; i.e., the ordering X l < Xc < Xf holds. The same ordering
applies to the production of output.
A classication of consumer surplus is then immediate, since process R&D reduces
marginal cost and expands output, thus leading to a larger consumer surplus.14
14Notice that process R&D implies an indirect e¤ect on (gross) consumer surplus via a reduction in
marginal cost, which is followed by an decrease in price. By way of contrast, product R&D raises quality
and indeed exerts a direct e¤ect on consumerssurplus, as quality enters directly the consumersutility
function (see e.g. Symeonidis, 2003).
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Corollary 2 Consumer surplus is ordered as follows:
CSf > CSc > CSl.
We now turn to compare the private rms prot across the three regimes. Thus, we
have the following:
Proposition 2 The private rms prots are the largest when it moves as a Stackelberg
R&D follower; i.e., the ordering l1 > 
f
1 > 
c
1 holds.
Proposition 2 shows that Stackelberg R&D leadership by the public rm increases the
private rms prots (compared with the other regimes). The reason is that in this case,
the public rms (welfare-maximizing) behaviour constrains total output, which in turn
expands the private rms prots.
Next, we are in position to identify the relationship between the order of the rms
R&D moves and producer surplus. This will assist us to classify welfare among the three
di¤erent situations.
Proposition 3 Producer surplus attains its highest value when the public rm acts as a
Stackelberg leader in choosing its R&D investment, while the lowest value corresponds to
the Cournot conjecture. That is,
PSl > PSf > PSc.
Proposition 3 claries that when the public rm retains leader position in R&D, the
rmsmarket power and so their prots are the highest. Consequently, consumer surplus
is the lowest (Corollary 2).
On the grounds of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, we proceed to present our main
results starting with the welfare comparisons among the three regimes. Pal (1998) showed
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that in an output setting duopoly the public rm may increase welfare by acting as a
Stackelberg leader.15 Matsumura (2003) reached a similar conclusion for a mixed market,
where the private rm is foreign. However, in some other instances these results may
not hold (see e.g. Nishimori and Ogawa, 2005, p. 285). In a similar spirit, the next
Proposition shows that in an R&D setting duopoly the preferable role for the public rm
is that of the follower in choosing its R&D investment.
Proposition 4 The ordering of welfare levels under the di¤erent structures  = c, f , l
in the timing of R&D setting are as follows:
SW f > SW l > SW c.
Proposition 4 indicates the desirable role of the public rm in the R&D game. More
precisely, the highest welfare is attained when the public rm acts as a Stackelberg
follower (while the private rm is the leader). The following remarks may be useful in
understanding the result: (i) when the public rm is the leader consumer surplus is the
lowest, while producer surplus is the highest; however, (ii) when the public rm invests in
R&D as a follower consumer surplus is the highest, but producer surplus is intermediate.
In what follows (i) and (ii) are compared to the case of Cournot competition. In case
(i), it turns out that the increase in producer surplus (PSl > PSf > PSc) relative to
the Cournot case is large enough and so outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus
(CSl < CSc); this implies an expansion in the level of total welfare (SW c < SW l). On
the other hand, in case (ii), we have an increase in both consumer (CSf > CSc) and
producer surplus (PSf > PSc); indeed, so large an increase that total welfare improves
15Pal (1998) showed that the situation in which the public rm is a Stackelberg leader in output,
whereas the private rm a follower, can be sustained as a SPNE if the number of private rms in the
industry is n  2 and the game lasts for two time periods. (In the rst period both rms announce when
they will produce and in the second period they choose their output levels.) If the game lasts for more
than two time periods there are two SPNE for the duopoly case. In one of those equilibria reported by
Jacques (2004), the public rm produces in period 1 and the private rm produces in the last period.
11
more than in the case where the public rm retains the R&D role of a Stackelberg leader
(SW c < SW l < SW f).
A second line of reasoning referring to the market failures at work is in order. As
is well-known, a mixed market su¤ers from two main distortions: underproduction due
to imperfect competition and ine¢ ciency in the allocation of production costs resulting
from the rmsdivergent objectives. It is worth noting that on the side of R&D another
important market failure operates; the so-called undervaluation e¤ect which leads to
underinvestment.16 However, the public rm may partially correct this distortion, as it
takes into account consumer surplus in its objective function. The main point here is
that the distortions on the side of R&D add to the ones on the side of output, thus
reinforcing underproduction as well as the ine¢ ciency in the distribution of equilibrium
costs. Hence, when the public rm is the follower in R&D, it can tackle underproduction
by increasing the level of total output (Qf > Ql); in addition to this, it can tackle the
ine¢ ciency in the distribution of production costs by raising the private rms production
share (xf1 > x
l
1; q
f
1 > q
l
1). The reverse holds when the public rm is the R&D leader and
therefore, it is always true that SW f > SW l.
5 Endogenous timing in the R&D decisions
We proceed to identify the SPNE outcomes of our R&D game in the case where the R&D
decision process can last up to two time periods (T = 1, 2).17 As is commonplace in the
game-theoretic literature, we propose a candidate equilibrium conguration (ti; tj), i 6= j,
i; j 2 f2; 3g and check whether there is a unilateral incentive for a rm to deviate. If no
16See, for instance, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998).
17If rms make their R&D decisions in exactly two time periods, then a sequential-moves R&D game
will emerge, with either the public or the private rm in the leader position. Obviously then, the entire
game will last for four time periods.
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rm can increase her payo¤ through a deviation, then the proposed conguration can be
sustained as a SPNE.
The main results are presented in the next two Propositions:
Proposition 5 The conguration where all rms choose simultaneously in the same time
period their R&D levels cannot be sustained as a SPNE.
The next Proposition contains two additional key results:
Proposition 6 (i) There is a SPNE outcome where the private rm chooses its R&D
level in period 2 and the public rm chooses its own R&D level in period 3; i.e., the
following timing holds, t0 = 3 and t1 = 2. (ii) There is a second SPNE where the reverse
timing holds; that is, t0 = 2 and t1 = 3.
Although the current model has a di¤erent focus from previous studies, we note that
Nishimori and Ogawa (2005) found for an output setting duopoly that the public rm
can either play the role of the leader or follower, i.e., there exist two SPNE. Moreover, on
the grounds of Propositions 4 and 6, it follows that in equilibrium the public rm may
play a desirable R&D role. In relation to this, Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003) showed
that the equilibrium and the desirable role of the public rm for an output setting mixed
market may coincide independently of whether the private rms are foreign or domestic
competitors.18
18We nd that a game in which the R&D decision process lasts for more than two time periods is not
very realistic, although previous authors have undertaken such analyses for output setting oligopolies (e.g.
Pal, 1998; Jacques, 2003; Lu, 2007). Our main concern is the rather restrictive (implicit) assumptions
made therein, that there is no discounting and that rms can produce only once. Admittedly though,
addressing these issues within a single model would make the analysis quite complex.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the sequence of the R&D moves in a mixed market. In
particular, utilizing two Stackelberg and one Cournot models of xed timing, we un-
covered the desirable R&D role of the rms. We also employed the observable delay
game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to study whether the welfare-maximizing and the
equilibrium roles coincide.
The foregoing analysis reveals that the desirable distribution of R&D roles occurs
when the private rm is the leader, whereas the public rm retains the follower position.
Furthermore, when the order of the R&D moves is endogenised, the public rm may play
this desirable role. Overall, these results complement previous studies that considered
endogenous timing in output nding that, under certain circumstances, the desirable
and equilibrium roles of the public rm may coincide, whether the private competitor is
a domestic or foreign rm (see Matsumura, 2003, p. 283).
The fact that the investigation of R&D competition in mixed markets brings about
new ndings, calls for more caution in public policy design and implementation at an
industry or national level. Again, using Norways oil industry as an example, Statoil
and Norske Shell (with Exxon to a lesser extent) carry out R&D, which is aimed at the
development of new energy technologies. In this respect, our study suggests (in a broader
perspective) that mixed markets may require some sort of coordination of their R&D
activities. While we do not wish to over-emphasize this point, we believe that the design
of innovation policies with clear-cut objectives and distribution of R&D roles across the
rms may be useful.
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Appendix A The SPNE solutions of the Cournot R&D game are as follows:
qc0 =
( 1 + 10k + 28k2 + 16k3)(A  c)
 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4
qc1 =
( 1 + 4k)(1 + 6k + 4k2)(A  c)
 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4
c0 =
kE(A  c)2
( 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4)2
c1 =
(1  4k)2k(A  c)2
( 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4)2
CSc =
2( 1 + 4k + 24k2 + 16k3)2(A  c)2
( 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4)2
SW c =
2(A  c)2
( 2 + 3k + 54k2 + 80k3 + 32k4)2 : (11)
where E = 1  29k  40k2 + 284k3 + 880k4 + 832k5 + 256k5;  = 7+ 43k + 80k2 +
60k3 + 16k4 and  = 1  4k   53k2 + 64k3 + 900k4 + 1616k5 + 1088k6 + 256k7.
Appendix B The SPNE outcomes of the Stackelberg R&D game with a public leader
are:19
xl1 =
( 1 + 4k)(1 + 3k + 2k2)(A  c)


ql0 =
(A  c)


ql1 =
(1 + 6k + 4k2)N(A  c)


l1 =
k(1  4k)2(1 + k)R3(A  c)2


CSl =
22(A  c)2

2
SW l =
4M(A  c)2


; (12)
where 
 =  16   57k + 394k2 + 2604k3 + 5528k4 + 5536k5 + 2688k6 + 512k7;
 = 7+36k+44k2+16k3;  =  9+28k+508k2+1544k3+1968k4+1152k5+256k6;
19For the sake of brevity, the expression for the prots of the public rm is omitted.
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N =  7  8k+ 100k2 + 160k3 + 64k4; R = 7+ 36k+ 44k2 + 16k3;  =  8  11k+
266k2 + 1136k3 + 1696k4 + 1088k5 + 256k6 and M =  2   5k + 56k2 + 314k3 +
468k4 + 288k5 + 64k6.
Appendic C The SPNE outcomes of the Stackelberg R&D game with a private leader
are:
xf0 =
G(A  c)
k 
qf0 =
T (A  c)
k 
qf1 =
(1 + 6k + 4k2)F (A  c)
k 
f1 =
(1 + k)(1 + 2k   20k2   16k3)2(A  c)
k 
CSf =
2Z2(A  c)2
k2 2
SW f =
2Y (A  c)2
k2 2
(13)
where   =  41  212k + 436k2 + 4624k3 + 10608k4 + 10944k5 + 5376k6 + 1024k7;
G =  2 13k+4k2+332k3+1296k4+1872k5+1152k6+256k7; T =  3 40k 20k2+
848k3+2912k4+3872k5+2304k6+512k7; F = 1 14k 28k2+184k3+320k4+128k5;
Z =  1   24k   64k2 + 404k3 + 2112k4 + 3328k5 + 2176k6 + 512k7 and Y =
 1+6k+539k2+4184k3 4536k4 161952k5 567936k6+337440k7+7366400k8+
+23116800k9+38684928k10+40008704k11+26411008k12+10878976k13+2555904k14+
262144k15.
Appendix D For the sake of brevity, we have set k = 1 in the proofs of Propositions
1  4 and Corollaries 1  2. It can be readily veried that the same results hold for
every value of k, with k > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1 : (i) xc0   xf0 = 1176(a c)5470753 ; xf0   xl0 = 606324(a c)563094451 (which imply,
xc0 > x
f
0 > x
l
0). (ii) x
c
1   xl1 =  216(a c)2870563 ; xl1   xf1 =  1660884(a c)563094451 ; (iii) qc0   qf0 =
1932(a c)
5470753
; qf0   ql0 = 69492(a c)563094451 ; (iv) qc1  ql1 =  396(a c)2870563 ; ql1  qf1 =  397848(a c)563094451 : Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1 : X l   Xc =  3492(a c)
2870563
; Xc   Xf =  15372(a c)
5470753
. Similarly,
Ql  Qc =  972(a c)
2870563
and Qc  Qf =  2688(a c)
5470753
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2 : CSf CSc = 7576445184(a c)2
29929138387009
; CSc CSl = 1436390496(a c)2
8240131936969
. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 2 : l1   f1 = 823959936(a c)
2
9679030518239
; f1   c1 = 7056(a c)
2
913615751
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 : PSc PSf =  1447528968(a c)2
8240131936969
; PSf PSl =  103893659771136(a c)2
317075360746991401
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 : SW c   SW l =  648(a c)2
479384021
; SW l   SW f =  1840955616(a c)2
18446411120309
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 : Suppose instead that both rms acting in the same time
period can be sustained as a SPNE, i.e., t0 = 2 and t1 = 2. From Proposition 4 (Prop.
2) we know that the public (private) rm can increase welfare (prot) by acting as a
Stackelberg R&D follower. This is a contradiction and hence, a Cournot game in R&D
cannot be sustained as a SPNE. The argument is similar if t0 = t1 = 3, since under
Cournot competition in R&D each rm receives the lowest possible payo¤. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 : In order to prove the claim in Proposition 6 (i) and given
Proposition 5, we have to check whether there is a unilateral incentive for the private
rm to choose its own R&D level in the subsequent time period 3. If the private rm
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would do so, then a Cournot game in R&D would arise. From Proposition 2, however,
we know that the private rm cannot increase its prot by acting as a Cournot player.
Thus, t0 = 3 and t1 = 2 can be sustained as a SPNE outcome.
We proceed to prove part (ii) of the Proposition. We have to show that the public
rm has no incentive to deviate and choose its R&D level in period 3. If the public rm
does so, a simultaneous moves (Cournot) game arises; that, from Proposition 4 decreases
welfare. Hence, t0 = 2 and t1 = 3 can be sustained as a second SPNE in the observable
delay game. Q.E.D.
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